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Alvin B. Rubin: Man of the Law
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr.*
I knew Al Rubin from the time I came to Chicago to become a
member of the faculty at the Law School of the University of Chicago
and Executive Director of the American Bar Foundation. Our acquain-
tance arose from some undertaking or another of the American Bar
Association, probably the project for the Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility. At the time, as I recall, Al was still a practicing lawyer,
or had recently been appointed as United States District Judge. He was
also a lecturer at the Law School at LSU. In any event, he came across,
as he then and everafter was, as a complete man of the law-learned,
reflective, tough-minded, practical, and deeply concerned with the well-
being of the community in which he lived. Would that all of us in the
profession lived up to his example.
For those who knew Judge Rubin, all such description is a poor
imitation of the person. For those who did not know him, however, a
distinct impression can be formed by reading his judicial opinions. These
official pronouncements decided concrete cases and clarified the law.
Occasionally, his decisions made law, to the extent that a lower court
judge can do so-and Judge Rubin was entirely aware of his place in
the system. These immediate "law jobs," as Karl Llewellyn called them,
were well and truly done. But beyond getting the job done, Judge
Rubin's opinions convey the depth of his knowledge of law practice
and of the intricacies in administration of ordinary justice. Perhaps
above all, they show how experience as a practicing lawyer can inform
the highest fulfillment of judicial office.
As a lawyer, Judge Rubin was primarily involved in trial work, but
he could truly be called an old-fashioned general practitioner. This
experience as a practicing lawyer made him intimately conversant with
the kinds of transactions that were presented to him as judge. An example
is a routine case he decided while a District Judge, Storm Drilling
Company v. Atlantic Richfield Corporation.' The immediate litigation
in that case was for attorney's fees incurred in defending a prior suit.
Judge Rubin's concise description of the prior suit reveals his familiarity
with the kind of transaction in question:
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In 1972 William E. Barnett, a mud logger employed by For-
mation Specialities, Inc. (Formation), filed suit in this court
against a vessel, the STORM-DRILL III, in rem; and in per-
sonam against Storm Drilling Company (Storm), Atlantic Rich-
field Company (Arco), Formation and their respective
insurers.... Arco had contracted with Formation to perform
mud logging services on an offshore drilling rig. It had contracted
with Storm to drill a well there. Its contract with Storm contained
an indemnity agreement covering in general claims arising out
of Arco's negligence .... Storm considered that the lawyer em-
ployed to defend Storm and Arco jointly would have a conflict
of interest; it therefore engaged separate counsel.
2
The foregoing passage reads smoothly and may look like an easy
exercise. However, such economy and grace in expression could come
only from someone who really knew what he was talking about: ad-
miralty proceedings in rem and in personam, the oil drilling business,
indemnity agreements, the prosecution and defense of personal injury
cases, and relationships with clients.
After having been elevated to the court of appeals, Judge Rubin
gives us a case involving a lending agreement and subsequent bankruptcy,
another vivid instance of the stuff of law practice:
Several banks joined in a single loan, governed by a participating
loan agreement. The borrower was thereafter forced into in-
voluntary bankruptcy. Some of the banks made a post-petition
loan to the trustee, in the hope of improving the debtor's
position, but one bank refused to join. Interpreting the language
of the participation agreement, the district court held that the
post-petition loan was not a "collection expense" or "disburse-
ment" as those terms were used in the agreement.'
This passage reads just as smoothly as that in Storm Drilling and
looks like another easy exercise. Again, however, such economy and
grace in expression could come only from an author familiar with the
kind of transaction under consideration: bank loan participation, bank-
ruptcy, "improving [a] position," and the costs and expenses incurred
in these legally intricate maneuvers.
These are mere samples, chosen virtually at random, from Judge
Rubin's workproduct on the bench. Even alone, however, they dem-
onstrate the point: here was a man who knew law practice from inside
and hence also knew from the inside the kinds of out-of-court trans-
2. Id. at 830-31.
3. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. First State Bank of Abilene, 779 F.2d 242,
243 (5th Cir. 1985).
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actions that lawyers deal with. And here was a man who brought that
intimate knowledge to bear in making judicial pronouncements.
Among the many subjects about which Judge Rubin made many
judicial pronouncements was the practice of law itself. This subject is
often called "legal ethics," and indeed is properly so called. The term
"ethics" derives from the Greek "ethos," meaning "usage" or "cus-
tom." More generally, it means "way of life." Judicial pronouncements
on legal ethics therefore are about the lawyer's way of life. They not
only describe that way of life but define and regulate it. Pronouncements
about how practice give life to the rules and conventions that govern
the profession and determine whether these, standards have been honored
in the specific instance.
Hear now some of Judge Rubin's pronouncements on our profes-
sion's way of life. These are made in the course of deciding ordinary
cases in a hard day's work of judging, not in Law Day speeches or
other apologies or self-congratulation.
Consider Lamar v. American Finance System of Fulton County,
Inc.4 The lawyer for the plaintiff, in resisting a motion for summary
judgment, sought to augment his position with evidence and legal ar-
gument presented after the trial judge had taken the motion under
submission. Every lawyer should know that this is impermissible, or at
least that the judge is not required to give heed to matter presented
after time has run. Adjudication in its very nature requires that argument
stop sometime; the deadlines for filing legal papers are little statutes of
limitation that give effect to this necessity. Speaking from knowledge
of this tragic truth, Judge Rubin said:
Lawyers of experience, who practice what we boast to be a
learned profession, owe a duty both to their clients and to the
court, and, perhaps, even to other members of their profession,
who appear as opposing counsel, to prepare cases properly, to
give the issues full consideration before preparing pleadings, and,
in general, to exercise diligence in the practice of their profession.
Code of Professional Responsibility DR 6-101. While a trial
court may use other remedial measures, we do not consider that
it was an abuse of discretion under the circumstances of this
case for the trial court to deny counsel the right, after submitting
the case on one set of hypotheses and learning that this was
not enough, to attempt to inject new issues in the hope of
achieving a different result.'
4. 577 F.2d 953 (5th Cir. 1978).
5. Id. at 955.
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Observe:
-"Lawyers of experience know": The rule being applied-that
late argument need not be considered-is not some arbitrary
invention of the law, but one of the rules of the game well
known to all who claim the right to play.
-"What we boast is a learned profession": We lawyers say
that ours is a learned profession and, although not all members
of our profession are in fact learned, saying that they are
commits lawyers to being judged as though they were. Hence,
they must be assumed to have a learned person's knowledge of
what is expected.
-"Owe a duty to their clients": The duties of a lawyer begin
with a duty to the client, because the functions of a lawyer
begin with having a client. The duty to the client entails a duty
to the court, because the lawyer's function for the client requires
dealing with the court on the terms laid down by the law,
specifically the law of procedure.
-"And to the court": Independent of the duty to the client
is the duty to the court. This duty is a concomitant of the
special right of lawyers to act in the courts on behalf of clients.
Formerly, this special right was called the "privilege" of prac-
ticing law. Whatever it is called, it is a legal power qualified-
like all legal powers-by legal responsibilities.
-"And, perhaps, even to other members of their profession":
The cautiously qualifying term "perhaps, even" reflects keen
awareness that the creation of a duty to other lawyers is arguable
in the minds of many lawyers but unthinkable to some. But
the rules of procedure, which the rules of ethics presuppose,
require that motion papers be served on opposing counsel. That
requirement creates a legal duty, one of many that exist to other
lawyers. The sanction for breach of these duties is rarely mon-
etary damages or even an injunction. The typical sanction is
invalidation of a legal undertaking that fails to comply with
such a duty. Hence, in the instant case, the trial court properly
treated as a legal nullity the "attempt to inject new issues in
the hope of achieving a different result."
Consider also McGowan v. King, Inc.6 This involved a determination
of the proper fee for a prevailing borrower-plaintiff under the fee-
shifting provision of the Truth in Lending Act. The damages awarded
were $218.02; the trial judge allowed the borrower an attorney's fee of
slightly over $3,000. While this may sound disproportionate, the court
of appeals, speaking through Judge Rubin, increased the award to nearly
6. 661 F.2d 48 (5th Cir. 1981).
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$10,000. Addressing the question of disproportionality, Judge Rubin
observed that the litigation had involved two appeals on the merits
before the instant appeal over the adequacy of the attorney's fees award.
He then said:
The borrower's counsel did not inflate this small case into a
large one; its protraction resulted from the stalwart defense.
And although defendants are not required to yield an inch or
to pay a dime not due, they may by militant resistance increase
the exertions required of their opponents and thus, if unsuc-
cessful, be required to bear that cost.
7
Observe again Judge Rubin's complete awareness of practical realities
in assessing the propriety of the fee claim. On its face, the claim appears
disproportionate to the point of banditry: $10,000 for enforcing a $200
claim-subject matter for another "lawyer joke." But consider:
-The very small damages award could have been the product of
parsimony by the trial judge, and hence no indisputable measure
of the value of the plaintiff's claim. Judge Rubin would know
that.
-If plaintiff incurred $10,000 in prosecuting the claim, defen-
dant surely must have spent at least a like sum in "stalwart
defense." That in turn invites the question of why the defendant
felt it worthwhile to offer "militant resistance" if the plaintiff's
claim was paltry. One inference occurring to a legally knowl-
edgeable mind is that the settlement value of the claim was not
paltry. If the claim had substantial settlement value, the plain-
tiff's lawyer was justified in putting a large effort into prose-
cuting it, even though the recovery actually obtained fell far
short. Winning on liability but being awarded minimal damages
is simply an ordinary risk in damages litigation. Another infer-
ence is that the defendant was resisting as a matter of principle,
in which case the defendant was "not required to yield an inch."
But if that was the case, then by the same token plaintiff was
no less justified in prosecuting as a matter of principle.
-And so, when the calculations have been made that take into
account the uncertainties as they appeared ex ante, rather than
merely the certainties as they appeared ex post, plaintiff's at-
torney fee claim appears not unreasonable at all. Unless, of
course, the standard of assessment is what would be reasonable
if there were no fee-shifting provision in the Truth in Lending
Act. But there is such an Act. The whole point of the Act,
which is a congressional mandate the court must accept, is that
7. Id. at 51.
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a losing defendant in Truth in Lending Act is "required to pay
that cost."
A moral that can be drawn is that the ethics of a litigation game
depend in part on the rules of the particular game. Judge Rubin knew
what they were.
A final example is Doe v. A Corporation.' This was a case in which
a lawyer formerly employed in a corporation's law department undertook
to bring a class action suit against the corporation on behalf of the
corporation's employees to establish certain rights under the company's
pension plan. The lawyer had worked on pension matters before he
resigned. The question before the court was whether the lawyer could
bring such an action. In addressing the problem, Judge Rubin said:
To allow Doe [the lawyer] to act as class representative would
create a tension between his obligation as representative to do
all he can to vindicate the rights of the class members and his
personal ethical duty to protect a corporation's [the former
client's] secrets. A lawyer may not, simply by assuming a new
identity, escape the strictures that would govern his conduct were
he representing the class as counsel....
If there are meritorious causes of action against a corporation,
someone other than Doe can and must file the suit .... If no
other class member ever learns of the claim, it may go forever
unvindicated. The lawyer's duty to his client creates the possi-
bility that his silence will permit valid claims to lie unasserted. 9
-"A lawyer may not, simply by assuming a new identity,
escape the strictures that ... govern his conduct." Being a
lawyer involves a professional servitude, a change in identity
that entails disabilities as well as powers. This servitude is in-
choate upon admission to practice but becomes actively engaged
when a lawyer takes on a client. As a lawyer for a client, one
has no right to be a class representative against the client, even
though a member of the protected class and even though others
similarly situated have the right. "A lawyer may not . . .escape
-"The lawyer's duty to his client creates the possibility that his
silence will permit valid claims to lie unasserted." The duty to
the client precludes not only potential class actions against the
client but most other litigation as well-perhaps all litigation
against a present client-and other kinds of endeavors inimical
to a client's interests as well. And this even though "the lawyer's
8. 709 F.2d 1043 (5th Cir. 1983).
9. Id. at 1047-48.
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silence ... will permit valid claims to lie unasserted." Lying
unasserted, by reason of a lawyer's silence, are not only valid
class actions but myriad other kinds of valid claims, and myriad
other endeavors that could right wrongs done or threatened by
clients.
"A lawyer may not escape ... that his silence will permit" wrongs
to go unrighted. This is a sobering truth about a lawyer's work, as Al
Rubin well knew. And it is a sobering truth as well about a judge's
work, for judges will never be told about injustices about which lawyers
are forbidden to tell. And thus complete justice remains beyond reach:
"Valid claims ... lie unasserted."
It takes strong will to acknowledge that fact-a special detachment-
and strong faith to continue in the law's work while knowing it-a
special engagement. Reconciling professional detachment with personal
engagement requires sensitivity to tragedy, and not only this but a sense
of humor. As shown by his life and work, Al Rubin had all of these.

